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UNDERSTANDING AND DEFENDING AGAINST 
MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL PEER REVIEW ANTITRUST 
CLAIMS 
Daniel M. Warnert 
I. INTRODUCTION: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, PEER REVIEW, AND 
ANTITRUST 
Observers dispute whether there really is a "crisis" in medical 
malpractice litigation and in the availability and cost of malpractice 
insurance.! It is not disputed, however, that Americans spend a large 
sum of money on health care. Such expenditures amounted to ap-
proximately 12"70 of the gross national product in 1989, up from 
7.4% in 1970.2 A deep-rooted perception is that a part of the increase 
in the cost of health care, maybe a large part, is caused by "explo-
sive" increases in malpractice claims; doctors often perform redun-
dant, exhaustive, and expensive tests to protect themselves from 
t B.A., 1971, University of Washington; J.D., 1975, University of Washington 
School of Law; M.A., 1977, Western Washington University. Associate Pro-
fessor, Dept. of Accounting (Business Law), College of Business; Western 
Washington University, Bellingham, WA. 
1. See PETER HUBER, THE LIABILITY CRISIS (1988). See also, William B. Glaberson 
& Christopher Farrell, The Explosion in Liability Lawsuits is Nothing but a 
Myth, Bus. WK., April 21, 1986, at 24 (arguing that tort reformists' calls for 
reform are premised on myths surrounding the nature and extent of the so-
called litigation explosion). For a complete examination of the alleged crisis, 
see Robert S. Adler, Stalking the Rogue Physician: An Analysis of the Health 
Care Quality Improvement Act, 28 AM. Bus. L.J. 683, 684-90 (1991) (examining 
the arguments on each side at length). See also Randall Bovbjerg, Legislation 
on Medical Malpractice: Further Developments and a Preliminary Report Card, 
22 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 499, 500-10 (1989) (discussing the "crisis"). 
2. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL CTR. FOR HEALTH 
STATISTICS, PUBLIC HEALTH SERVo 425 (1991). Personal health insurance costs 
increased at an annual rate of 20.7070 for the period 1980-85, and 11.1% for 
1985-88. Id. at 430. The cost of health insurance for a typical employee and 
his or her dependents in Los Angeles was found to be $7,577 per year, 
compared to $3,197 per year in Glen Falls, New York, according to a survey 
undertaken by actuarial consultants Milliman & Roberson, Inc. Gene Koretz, 
Where Employers Can Find Sanctuary, Bus. WK., December 16, 1991 at 20. 
The survey was based on typical group health insurance packages. Id. The 
total amount of Gross National Product spent on health care in the United 
States is estimated at $671 billion, or $2,660 per person (1. Ratner, The High 
Cost of Health, 13 G.A.D. 3). 
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potential liability. The perceived increase in malpractice claims has 
generated calls for better mechanisms to identify and weed out bad 
doctors. If successful, this would reduce malpractice and the necessity 
for defensive testing and procedures, thereby lowering malpractice 
insurance rates and ultimately reducing medical costs. 
The mechanisms currently used to police the medical profession 
are the threat of malpractice claims, the regulating activities of state 
licensing boards, and peer review. One observer has asserted that 
neither the threat of malpractice claims nor state oversight are 
sufficient deterrents.3 Peer review usually involves a group of local 
doctors, and sometimes staff members, conducting a hearing to 
determine whether the subject physician has provided competent 
service. It does, however, have inherent weaknesses. Undoubtedly, 
many doctors are reluctant to criticize members of their own profes-
sion. As one commentator has observed, "physicians who serve on 
peer review boards make neither money nor friends. "4 One thing 
reviewing physicians can make, however, is a tempting target for 
litigation by physicians subject to such revjew. Doctors facing disci-
plinary action may bring claims for various torts including defama-
tion, denial of due process, and tortious interference with business 
relations.s Even more potentially damaging are claims that peer 
reviewers are engaged in a conspiracy to restrain trade in violation 
of antitrust laws. 
The antitrust claim which may be asserted is that the peer review 
boards are engaged in a conspiracy to drive the physician under 
review out of business in order to reduce competition. These "group 
boycott" claims are serious because the' physician-defendants are 
3. Adler, supra note 1, at 692-96. Robert Adler argues that the state boards are 
seriously underfunded, that many members of such bars are uncomfortable 
judging their peers, and the boards "rarely have good sources of information 
regarding lapses in physicians' services." [d. at 693-94. The threat of malprac-
tice claims is an insufficient deterrent "because insurance, rather than physi-
cians, usually pays claims, and because insurance premiums are typically based 
on type of practice rather than on any specific physician's litigation record." 
[d. at 695 n.3. Additionally, the forum courts that adjudicate such malpractice 
claims "have no direct authority to suspend or remove a physician from 
practice." [d. 
4. [d. at 697. 
5. See, e.g., Decker v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 982 F.2d 433, 434 (lOth Cir. 1992) 
(involving suit by plaintiff doctor against peer review panel members and the 
hospital for "breach of various contractual and common law tort duties; 
violations of the Sherman Act, RICO, and the federal extortion statute; 
violations of similar Utah statutes; and conspiracy to deprive Dr. Decker of 
his civil rights"); Austin v. McNamara, 979 F.2d 728, 732 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(involving suit by plaintiff for "antitrust violations ... civil rights violations 
... and pendent state law claims of conspiracy and intentional interference 
with prospective economic advantage"). 
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subject to treble damages under antitrust laws,6 and because such 
damages are not covered by insurance.7 In response to the chilling 
effect such claims have on vigorous peer review, Congress adopted 
the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 19868 to provide some 
degree of antitrust immunity by restricting the circumstances under 
which. peer reviewers face the threat of antitrust liability. 
This Article provides background on group boycott law and 
examines some antitrust implications of the physician peer review 
process in view of recent trends to change traditional group boycott 
analysis. Also considered are the impact of the Health Care Quality 
Improvement Act on peer review boycott cases and recent Supreme 
Court analysis of the Act. Finally, the Article discusses possible 
defenses to claims of antitrust violations brought against members 
of medical peer review committees. 
II. PROFESSIONAL GROUP BOYCOTT CASES: THE 
EROSION OF TRADITIONAL PER SE ANALYSIS 
A. Traditional Analysis 
Until recently, the antitrust analysis used by the Supreme Court 
held that horizontal boycotts were illegal per se.9 A horizontal boycott 
consists of a concerted refusal to deal among competitors at the same 
level of market structure as the target of the boycott. JO Early Supreme 
Court cases went so far as to suggest that every restraint of trade 
was condemned by Congress with the passage of the Sherman An-
titrust Act ("the Sherman Act").11 No proof that competitive harm 
6. See Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94 (1988) (tripling jury award of $650,000 to 
$1,950,000). 
7. Adler, supra note I, at 699 n.82. The American Medical Association is noted 
as arguing that those alarmed at the Patrick v. Burget award were concerned 
that "'doctors who seek to discipline other doctors they consider incompetent 
should not be put at risk of huge damage awards for which insurance is not 
available, whenever a jury can be convinced their motives were not pure.'" 
Id. (quoting Stuart Taylor, Jr., Doctors Can Sue in Peer Reviews, Justices 
Dec/are, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1988, at I). 
8. 42 U.S.C. § IHOI (1993). 
9. See, e.g., Klors, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc~, 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959) 
(holding that a concerted refusal to deal constituted a per se violation of the 
Sherman Act). 
10. See WILLIAM C. HOLMES, ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK § 101 (1987). 
II. See, e.g., United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 312-13 
(1897) (stating that the Sherman Act provides that "every contract, combination 
in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or 
commerce among the several states or with foreign nations" is declared to be 
illegal). 
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resulted was needed in per se casesY Two well-known cases serve as 
examples. 
In Klors, Inc. v. Broadway-Hall Stores, Inc., 13 the plaintiff 
owned a retail appliance store. He charged that the defendants (a 
competing appliance retailer, its manufacturers, and their distributors) 
had conspired not to sell appliances to him or to sell only on 
discriminatory and unfair terms}4 The defendants did not dispute 
the allegations, but "showed that there were hundreds of other 
household appliance retailers, some within a few blocks of Klors 
who sold many competing brands, including those the defendants 
refused to sell to Klors. "IS The district court and the court of appeals 
then found that, notwithstanding the apparent conspiracy, there was 
still vigorous competition in the appliance business, no public harm, 
and therefore no Sherman Act violation. 16 The Supreme Court re-
versed. The Court quoted from Standard Oil Co. v. United States,17 
construing the Sherman Act to prohibit and denounce all "contracts 
or acts which ... had a monopolistic tendencY,"18 and said this kind 
of group boycott had "long been held to be in the forbidden 
category" 19 that could not be saved from illegality by showing that 
it regulated prices, or brought about no deterioration in quality. 
Such agreements "cripple[d] the freedom of traders and thereby 
restrain[ed] their ability to sell in accordance with their own judg-
ment."2O Demonstration of an effect on prices is not essential to a 
Sherman Act violation.21 
The second familiar example is United States v. General Motors 
Corp. ,22 which involved a more egregious restraint of trade. A number 
12. [d. See also United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 146-47 
(1966) (finding restraint of trade in violation of Sherman Act where General 
Motors collaborated with dealers and associations to eliminate competitors by 
terminating dealings between them and a l,J1inority of Chevrolet dealers and to 
deprive franchised dealers of the choice of dealing through discounters) .. 
13. 359 U.S. 207 (1959). 
14. [d. at 207-09. 
15. [d. at 210. 
16. [d. 
17. 221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
18. Klors, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 211 (1959) (quoting 
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. I, 57 (1911». 
19. [d. at 212. 
20. [d. at 212 (quoting Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram and Sons, 340 U.S. 211 
(1951». 
21. "This is not a case of a single trader refusing to deal with another, nor even 
of a manufacturer and a dealer agreeing to an exclusive distributorship. Alleged 
in this complaint is a wide combination consisting of manufacturers, distributors 
and a retailer. . . . It interferes with the natural flow of commerce." [d. at 
212-13. 
22. 384 U.S. 127 (1966). 
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of Los Angeles area General Motors (GM) dealers complained to the 
car manufacturer about "discount house" sales operations that were 
run directly or indirectly by franchised dealers.23 Such "discount 
houses" were, according to the complaining dealers, in breach of the 
"location clause" of the Dealer Selling Agreement, and the sale by 
discounters left the non-discounters with the burden of performing 
free new car warranty work (for which they were not compensated 
by GM) and time consuming "pre-conditioning" which was required 
by both GM and the market.24 GM obtained from each dealer in the 
area a promise not to do business with the discounters, and three 
dealer organizations undertook to police the agreement.2S They hired 
a professional investigator who was instructed to try to purchase new 
Chevrolets from the proscribed outlets, to tape record the transactions 
and to gather evidence to lay "at the doorstep of Chevrolet. "26 The 
wayward dealers were forced to repurchase the cars and to promise 
to end their discount operations.27 A criminal trial against the defen-
dants resulted in a not guilty verdict. 28 Subsequently the civil trial 
court found for the defendants, but the Supreme Court reversed. 
Justice Fortas said: 
We have here a classic conspiracy in restraint of trade: joint, 
collaborative action by dealers, appellee associations, and 
General Motors to eliminate a class of competitors by 
terminating business dealings between them and a minority 
of Chevrolet dealers and to deprive franchised dealers of 
their freedom to contract through discounters if they so 
choose.29 
The usual apologies for this kind of joint activity, which preserves 
the collaborators' profit margins or their distribution system, were 
sharply dismissed as wholly unacceptable. This kind of activity, the 
Court said, is per se illegal and falls into that category of agreements 
which because of their pernicious effect on competition and 
lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to 
be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate in-
quiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business 
excuse for their use .... The principle of these cases is that 
where businessmen concert their actions in order to deprive 
23. [d. at 129-35. 
24. [d. at 133. 
25. [d. at 136. 
26. /d. at 137. 
27. [d. at 138. 
28. [d. 
29. /d. at 140. 
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others of access to merchandise which the latter wish to sell 
to the public, we need not inquire into the economic mo-
tivation underlying their conduct. 30 
B. The Erosion oj Per se Analysis: Commodities 
The Court's vigorous denunciati'on of concerted horizontal boy-
cotts as being illegal per se has changed; the category of restraints 
to be considered using per se analysis is decreasing. With respect to 
commodity commerce, Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pa-
cific Stationery & Printing CO.31 is a notable case. Northwest Whole-
sale Stationers was a purchasing co-operative made up of about 100 
office supply retailers in the Pacific Northwest, acting as the primary 
wholesaler for the retailers.32 Although non-members could purchase 
wholesale supplies from Northwest, members received an end-of-the 
year percentage rebate;33 members, therefore, had a significant price 
advantage. In 1978 the membership of Northwest voted to expel 
Pacific Stationery.34 Pacific had apparently violated one or more of 
the "reasonable rules [co-ops] must establish in order to function 
effectively."3s Pacific sued, contending that its expUlsion from the 
co-operative without procedural safeguards was a group boycott and 
therefore a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.36 Finding 
no anticompetitive effects on the basis of the record as presented, 
the district court granted summary judgment for the defendantsY 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding "that 
the uncontroverted facts of this case support a finding of per se 
liability. ' '38 
The Supreme Court overturned the decision of the Ninth Circuit 
and held that the absence of procedural safeguards had nothing to 
do with antitrust violations. If the acts of the co-op amounted to a 
per se Sherman Act violation, "no amount of procedural protection 
would [have] save[d] it. "39 While it is clear that group boycotts were 
per se illegal,40 it is less clear what constitutes a group boycott. 
Usually the boycott involves a conspiracy to deny something a 
30. [d. at 146. 
31. 472 U.S. 284 (1985). 
32. [d. at 286. 
33. [d. 
34. [d. at 287. 
35. [d. at 296. 
36. [d. at 288. 
37. [d. 
38. 472 U.S. 274, 288 (quoting Pacific Stationary & Printing Co. v. Northwest 
Wholesale Stationers, Inc., 715 F.2d 1393 (9th Cir. 1983». 
39. 472 U.S. at 293. 
40. See supra note 11. 
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competitor needs to operate, such as denial of access to market 
information for a stockbrokerage, denial of required certification of 
a product for a stove-manufacturer, denial of sources of news to a 
news service, or denial of wholesale supplies to a retailer. 41 In each 
of these types of cases, the likely anticompetitive animus may be 
presumed; the anticompetitive impact is great and the likely pro-
competitive impact small. But expulsion from a wholesale co-opera-
tive does not necessarily imply anticompetitive animus; and unless 
the co-operative possesses market power or exclusive access to an 
element essential to effective competition, the conclusion that expul-
sion is virtually always likely to have an anticompetitive effect is not 
warranted. As stated by the Court: 
A plaintiff seeking application of the per se rule must present 
a threshold case that the challenged activity falls into a 
category likely to have predominately anti-competitive im-
pacts. The mere allegation of a concerted refusal to deal 
does not suffice because not all concerted refusals to deal 
are predominately anticompetitive.42 
c. The Erosion of Per se Analysis: Services 
The "typical" antitrust violation involves commodities. The 
Clayton Act, for example, is specifically limited to "commodities in 
interstate commerce."43 In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,44 however, 
one of the defenses raised by the Bar Association when its minimum 
price list for attorneys' services was challenged as violative of the 
Sherman Act was that "Congress never intended to include the 
learned professions within the terms 'trade or commerce' in section 
1 of the Sherman Act, and therefore the sale of professional services 
is exempt from the Act. "45 The court of appeals had noted that 
"there has long been judicial recognition of a limited exclusion of 
'learned professions' from the scope of antitrust laws" because such 
professions are state regulated. 46 The Supreme Court, however; found 
no legislative support for the necessary exclusion of learnedprofes-
sions from the Sherman Act.47 The Court did, however, strongly 
suggest that antitrust violations of the Sherman Act, which might 
41. Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationary & Printing Co., 472 
U.S. 274, 294 (1985) (citing examples of boycott conspiracies). 
42. [d. at 298. 
43. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1993). 
44. 421 U.S. 773 (1975). 
45. [d. at 786. 
46. [d. at 779-80. 
47. [d. at 786. 
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properly be viewed as a per se violation in a context other than a 
service industry, should be analyzed under the Rule of Reason: 48 
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as 
distinguished from a business is, of course, relevant in 
determining whether that particular restraint violates the 
Sherman Act. It would be unrealistic to view the practice 
of professions as interchangeable with other business activ-
ities, and automatically to apply to the professions antitrust 
concepts which originated in other areas. The public service 
aspect, and other features of the professions, may require 
that a particular practice, which could properly be viewed 
as a violation of the Sherman Act in another context, be 
treated differently. 49 
Not only, then, have the kinds of restraints considered per se violative 
been decreasing in the context of commodities transactions, but in 
the very first case questioning the Sherman Act's applicability in the 
area of professional services the Court narrowed the scope of the 
.law by suggesting that per se analysis was inappropriate. 
D. Per Se Analysis in the Health Care Field 
In 1980 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that 
a "'boycott' characterization ... avails us little in determining 
whether an agreement . . . is per se illegal. Because of the special 
considerations involved in the delivery of health services,"5o the court 
determined that a Rule of Reason analysis is appropriate. 51 The 
Supreme Court specifically confirmed this holding in FTC v. Indiana 
Federation of Dentists. 52 A group of Indiana dentists formed what 
they styled a "union" in order to promulgate a "work rule" that 
required members to withhold X-rays requested by dental insurers 
for use in evaluating claims. 53 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
issued a complaint against the Federation. The FTC claimed the 
dentists' actions constituted a violation of section 5 of the Federal 
48. "Rule of Reason" analysis requires a general inquiry into whether the chal-
lenged practice unreasonably restricts competition given all the circumstances. 
See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. I (1910). 
49. Gold/arb, 421 U.S. at 788-89 n.17. 
50. Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield of Va., 624 F.2d 
476, 484-85 (4th Cir. 1980). . 
51. Id. 
52. 476 U.S. 447, 458-59 (1986). 
53. Insurers examined the X-rays to determine whether the dentists' diagnostic and 
treatment decisions were the most cost-effective, and the practice was "viewed 
by some dentists as a threat to their professional independence and economic 
well-being." Id. at 449. 
1993] Medical Professional Peer Review Antitrust Claims 277 
Trade Commission Act54 because they amounted to a conspiracy in 
restraint of trade and were therefore illegal as judged under the 
Supreme Court's interpretation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. The 
Court found that the conspiracy existed and that it had resulted in 
a restraint of trade. A restraint of trade, the Court observed, is only 
illegal, however, if it is per se unreasonable or "because it violates 
what has come to be known as the 'Rule of Reason."'55 The 
Federation's policy could fairly be labelled a "group boycott," the 
Court observed, but that did not render it per se illegal: 
Although this Court has in the past stated that group 
boycotts are unlawful per se, we decline to resolve this case 
by forcing the Federation's policy into the "boycott" pi-
geonhole and invoking the per se rule. . . . [T]he category 
of restraints classed as group boycotts is not to be expanded 
indiscriminately, and the per se approach has generally been 
limited to cases in which firms with market power boycott 
suppliers or customers in order to discourage them from 
doing business with a competitor-a situation obviously not 
present here .... [I]n general, [we have been reluctant] to 
extend per se analysis to restraints imposed in the context 
of business relationships where the economic impact of 
certain practices is not immediately obvious.56 
The maintenance of high quality medical services is traditionally 
policed by peer review groups. Physicians whose practices are sub-
standard may be put on pr.obation; in egregious cases, physician 
54. Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982 & Supp. 1993). 
55. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 457-58. 
56. Id. at 458-59 (citations omitted). Finding a Rule of Reason violation with these 
facts was "not a matter of any great difficulty," even without elaborate 
market-definition and market-power analysis (which the IFD insisted was 
needed), since there was no dispute that insurers in the locations "served" by 
the IFD were actually unable to obtain cQmpliance with their requests for X-
rays and, thus, could not possibly police costs: there were sustained adverse 
effects on competition in the areas where the IFD dentists predominated. Id. 
at 495. The IFD also claimed there could be no Rule of Reason violation 
without a finding that the result of the "conspiracy" was an increase in prices. 
Id. at 461-62. The Court disagreed: the withholding of information desired by 
consumers for determining whether a purchase is cost-justified was obviously 
likely to disrupt the market's price-setting mechanism, and no proof of price 
impact was needed. Id. The IFD's final assertion, that non-competitive "quality 
of care" justifications for the boycott of insurers should be considered was 
dismissed too. Id. at 462-64. The Court said this amounted to the argument 
that "an unrestrained market in which consumers are given access to the 
information they believe will be relevant to their choices will lead them to 
make unwise and even dangerous choices," which is "nothing less than a 
frontal assault on the basic policy of the Sherman Act." Id. at 463. 
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privileges are revoked upon recommendation by review committeesY 
The reviewers in such a situation are, however, in a tenuous position. 
They usually compete with the doctor whose medical standards are 
in question. Not infrequently the doctor complains that the motiva-
tion to revoke his or her privileges is not the maintenance of high 
standards, but his or her removal as a competitor. 58 The complaining 
physician then becomes the plaintiff in a federal antitrust case claim-
ing a group boycott in violation of antitrust laws. 
Medical malpractice is a more complex problem than cut-rate 
automobile selling, so group boycotts by peer review boards have 
never been subject to the somewhat simplistic per se analysis; peer-
policing of malpracticioners is not automatically illegal. For example, 
in Goss v. Memorial Hospital System,59 a Rule of Reason analysis 
was applied where the plaintiff physician complained of being ex-
cluded from practice at hospitals by a denial of staff privileges. The 
Fifth Circuit confirmed the district court's finding that mere expUlsion 
does not imply anticompetitive animus. The court agreed that the 
evidence failed to show that the hospitals possessed "market power 
or unique access to a business element necessary for effective 
competition"60 so that their boycotting of Dr. Goss denied him 
competitive opportunities.61 
If the medical peer review process escapes per se analysis, 
relegation to Rule of Reason proves dangerous for peer reviewer 
defendants. It is an onerous business to mount a Rule of Reason 
defense, as it requires a showing that the ostensibly anticompetitive 
activity had a valid non-anticompetitive purpose (Le., the actors had 
good faith).62 Even if the defendants are successful, the threat of 
57. Peer review is one step in a long process by which unacceptable medical 
practices are monitored, checked and reviewed. The peer review committee is 
typically one of four committees involved. The final decision on hospital 
privileges is made by the governing board. 
58. See Manion v. Evans, 986 F.2d 1036, 1037 (6th Cir. 1993) ("physicians 
aggrieved by the results of peer review increasingly appeared in federal court 
claiming that the actions of their peers were anti-competitive and violate federal 
antitrust laws. "). 
59. 789 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1986). 
60. [d. at 355 (quoting Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationary 
& Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 291 (1985». 
61. [d. at 355. The hospitals each had less than 6070 of the total beds in the county . 
. [d. 
62. See, e.g., Theater Enters. v. Paramount Film Distribution Corp., 346 U.S. 537 
(1954). The plaintiff, a suburban movie theater owner, sued Paramount alleging 
that its policy of restricting first-run motion pictures to downtown theaters was 
a conspiracy in restraint of trade. [d. at 538. The distributors successfully 
defended themselves by adducing evidence of the economies of movie distri-
bution: the necessity of an adequate population base (not found in suburban 
areas), available public transportation, and greater opportunities for advertising. 
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costly and traumatic litigation chills vigorous peer review, and there-
fore increases the likelihood of poorly policed medicaf practice, and 
increases malpractice insurance rates. 
III. THE HEALTH CARE QUALITY IMPROVEMENT ACT 
OF f9"86 (HCQIA) 
A. The Purpose and Background of the HCQIA 
Since the effective date of the HCQIA in October 1989, parti-
cipants in physician peer review processes who are acting in good 
faith have a better defense than the Rule of Reason. Congress adopted 
the HCQIA to encourage effective physician peer review by discour-
aging the threat of private antitrust action against critical reviewers.63 
The Act provides a limited exception from antitrust liability to the 
peer review group, any person acting as a member or staff to the 
body, any person acting under contract with the body, and any 
person participating with the body.64 No immunity is provided, 
however, from actions by the Federal Trade Commission, the United 
States Department of Justice, or state or federal attorneys genera1.6~ 
Immunity from malpractice actions is likewise not available.66 The 
Act also sets up a national clearinghouse for information regarding 
physicians.67 
[d. at 540. The Supreme Court affirmed a finding that refusal to grant first-
run licenses to suburban theaters was - considering the "adequate explanation" 
- within the Rule of Reason. [d. at 540-42. Demonstrating such "adequate 
expl~nation" is of course time consuming and expensive. As to the evidence 
necessary to show "good faith" in the medical peer review arena, see section 
IlI.D., infra. 
63. H.R. REp. No. 903, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
6384. This provides in relevant part: 
The purpose of this legislation is to improve the quality of medical 
care by encouraging physicians to identify and discipline other phy-
sicians who are incompetent or who engage in unprofessional behavior. 
Under this bill, hospitals and physicians that conduct peer review 
will be protected from damages in suits by physicians who lose their 
hospital privileges, provided the peer review actions meet the due 
process and other standards established in the bill. In addition, hos-
pitals and physicians that discipline doctors will be required to report 
these disciplinary actions to the state medical boards. In turn, the 
state medical boards will be required to forward this information to 
the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services .... 
[d. at 6384. 
64. 42 U.S.C. § lllll(a)(l) (1993). 
65. [d. § 1l1l1(a)(I). 
66. [d. § 1133(c)(I). 
67. [d. § 1134(b). 
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The United States House of Representatives Energy and Com-
merce Committee was primarily responsible for drafting the Act. The 
Committee reported as follows: 
This bill is needed to deal with one important aspect of the 
medical malpractice problem in this country-incompetent 
and unprofessional -physicians. It does not address the mal-
practice insurance crisis, which has extremely complex and 
controversial origins and cannot be solved through peer 
review. The bill's focus is. on those instances in which 
physicians injure patients through incompetent or unprofes-
sional service, are identified as incompetent or unprofes-
sional by their medical colleagues, but are dealt with in a 
way that allows them to continue to injure patients. 
Unfortunately, groups such as state licensing boards, hos-
pitals and medical societies that should be weeding out 
incompetent or unprofessional doctors often do not do so. 
Even when such bodies do act against bad physicians, these 
physicians find it all too easy to move to different hospitals 
or states and continue their practices in these new 10cations.68 
The Committee specifically referred to the damaging effect on 
effective peer review of both the threat of antitrust litigation and 
high malpractice insurance rates: 
The reporting system [proposed in this legislation], however, 
creates a major problem. Many people in the medical field 
told the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment that 
the reporting system would inevitably result in an enormous 
increase in litigation. The reason: faced with the certainty 
that they can no longer hide their past records, physicians 
facing disciplinary action will feel compelled to challenge 
vigorously any action taken against them. Based on recent 
experience, the Committee believes that many of these phy-
sicians will file antitrust' lawsuits. 
Even though defendants may often win these lawsuits, 
that may not be sufficient to guarantee enthusiastic, or even 
minimally adequate, peer review .... Doctors who are suf-
ficiently fearful of the threat of litigation will simply not 
do meaningful peer review. The result would be to continue 
the possibility for abuse by bad doctors.69 
68. H.R. REp. No. 903, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
6384-85. . 
69. [d. at 6385. 
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B. Application of the HCQIA 
The Health Care Quality Improvement Act76 was interpreted for 
the first time in Austin v. McNamara.71 At age 65, Dr. George Austin 
retired as Chairman of the Lorna Linda University School of Medi-
cine.72 He had spent his entire medical career as an instructor and 
professor of neurosurgery.73 Subsequently, he took up private practice 
at the Cottage Hospital in Santa Barbara, California.74 Within five 
years the Cottage Hospital Medical Executive Committee was con-
cerned enough about Dr. Austin's performance to establish an ad 
hoc committee "to investigate concerns voiced by the staff that 
Plaintiff Dr. Austin was providing substandard care to his patients 
at the hospital." 75 Dr. Austin was suspended from practicing at 
Cottage Hospital for seven months, after which he was reinstated 
subject to various conditions.76 Dr. Austin sued the hospital and five 
physicians, claiming they conspired to restrain him from competing 
against them. 77 
The defendants moved for a summary judgment, claiming that 
the HCQIA immunized them from antitrust liability.7s The district 
court agreed. To invoke the Act's protection, a defendant must show 
three things: (1) that the professional review actions complied with 
standards set forth in 42 U.S.C. section 11112; (2) that the results 
of the professional review actions were properly reported to state 
authorities in compliance with the Act; and (3) that the actions 
occurred after November 14, 1986, the effective date of the Act. 79 
For a professional review action to comply with the Act, section 
11112(a) provides that it must be taken: 
(1) in the reasonable belief that the action was in the 
furtherance of quality health care, 
(2) after. a reasonable effort to obtain the facts of the 
matter, 
(3) after adequate notice and hearing procedures are af-
forded to the physician involved or after such other proce-
dures as are fair to the physician under the circumstances, 
(4) in the reasonable belief that the action was warranted 
by the facts known after such reasonable effort to obtain 
70. 42 U.S.C. § 11101 (1993). 
71. 731 F. Supp. 934 (C.D. Cal. 1990). 
72. [d. at 935. 
73. [d. 
74. [d. 
75. [d. at 936. 
76. [d. at 937-38. 
77. [d. at 935. 
78. Id: at 938. 
79. [d. at 939. 
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facts and after meeting the requirement of paragraph (3).80 
There was no serious question in the case that the defendants 
satisfied every requirement. Summary judgment was therefore granted 
in their favor. 
C. Limitations on Usefulness of the HCQIA 
The HCQIA is no panacea for the problems of medical profes-
sional peer review. One commentator observed in an early review of 
the Act that it might have only limited utility: 
The Act seems likely to affect only one aspect of malpractice 
problems-the severe or repeat offender, who is meant to 
be curtailed in her career prospects. All hospitals or other 
entities hiring a physician are required to check the data 
bank for information about that physician; what they do 
with the information is up to them. This duty means that, 
should a problem develop, employers who do not check 
may face a lawsuit at some future date for negligent failure 
to monitor physicians .... Otherwise, the Act contains no 
enforcement mechanisms. The Act may very indirectly affect 
quality more broadly through its encouragement of hospital 
peer review; it gives limited immunity from liability for 
participation in review activities. 81 
Indeed, prospects that the Act would encourage hospital peer 
review were dimmed by the first United States Supreme Court case 
to consider - albeit indirectly - the Act. The problem is that the 
Act gives limited immunity only; bad faith peer review is not pro-
tected. If the mere allegation that there h.as been bad faith review 
against a single doctor is sufficient to trigger federal antitrust juris-
diction, the prospects of vigorous peer reviews are chilled, for re-
viewers know they may face a daunting and expensive civil antitrust 
action. 
Whether federal jurisdiction under the Sherman Act reaches the 
typical peer review case was considered by the Supreme Court in 
Summit Health Ltd. v. Pinhas.82 In that case, the Court held that 
80. 42 U.S.C. § 11112(a) (1993). 
81. Bovbjerg, supra note I, at 538. The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit confirmed that the HCQIA provides only limited immunity when 
it ruled that the Act does not provide among its protections the right not to 
stand trial: "all the statutory language accomplishes with certainty is to shield 
peer reviewers from liability for payment of damages .... [It] does not confer 
a right not to stand trial .... " Manion v. Evans, 986 F.2d 1036, 1042 (6th 
Cir. 1993). 
82. Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, III S. Ct. 1842 (1991). 
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the Sherman Act did in fact apply. The Pin has case involved Dr. 
Simon J. Pirihas, an eye surgeon, who became embroiled with the 
Midway Hospital Medical Center in a dispute about staffing levels. 
He was able to perform eye surgery more cheaply than his peers 
because he did not need an assistant and Medicare had stopped 
funding for the second doctor. 83 To make Dr. Pinhas's services as 
expensive as the other doctors' (who used the second surgeon), the 
hospital presented him with what he called "a sham contract" to 
sign by which he would receive $36,000 (later orally increased to 
$60,(00) a year for services he would not be asked to perform.84 Dr. 
Pinhas refused to execute the contract.85 Ultimately Dr. Pinhas's staff 
privileges were suspended, and the suspension was affirmed by the 
Midway Executive Committee.86 He then sought and obtained a 
hearing by the Midway Judicial Review Committee, which upheld 
only one of the seven charges against him and recommended rein- . 
statement subject to several special conditions. 87 This decision was 
then appealed to the Governing Board of the Hospital, which af-
firmed the decision of the Judicial Review Committee, but imposed 
more stringent conditions upon Pinhas's probationary period.88 Notice 
of Pinhas's termination was disseminated to hospitals in California 
and throughout the entire country pursuant to 42 U.S.C. sections 
11133 and 11135.89 Pinhas claimed that, as a result of this action, 
the hospital had effectively boycotted his practice and precluded him 
from continued participation in the marketplace;90 he thereafter 
brought a Sherman Act action against the hospital and the doctors 
who served on the review panel. 91 The district court granted the 
defendant's motion to dismiss on the pleadings and Dr. Pinhas 
appealed to the Ninth Circuit.92 
When the case reached the court of appeals, the hospital claimed 
the federal court lacked jurisdiction to hear the Sherman Act claim 
because there was no adequate showing of "a required nexus with 
interstate commerce. "93 The court noted that the test set out by the 
Supreme Court was whether "'as a matter of practical economics' 
the Hospital's activities have a 'not insubstantial effect on the inter-





88. Id. at 1846 n.5. 
89. Id. at 1845. 
9O.Id. 
91. Id. at 1843. 
92.Id. 
93. Pinhas v. Summit Health, Ltd., 894 F.2d 1024, 1028, 1031 (9th Cir. 1989). 
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state commerce involved.'''94 Construing this language, the court 
said: 
Pinhas need not ... make [a] more particularized showing 
of the effect on interstate commerce caused by the alleged 
conspiracy to keep him from working. He need only prove 
that peer-review proceedings have an effect on interstate 
commerce, a fact that can hardly be disputed. The proceed-
ing affected the entire staff at Midway and thus affect the 
hospital's interstate commerce. Appellees' contention that 
Pinhas failed to allege a nexus with interstate commerce 
because the absence of Pinhas's services will not drastically 
affect the interstate commerce of Midway therefore misses 
the mark and must be rejected.9s 
From the adverse Ninth Circuit decision on the antitrust issue, 
the hospital sought and was granted certiorari to the Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Court examined whether Dr. Pinhas's complaint sat-
isfied the jurisdictional requirements of the Sherman Act.96 Because 
the case came before the Court following the trial court's granting 
a motion to dismiss on the pleadings, the truth of the allegations 
was assumed. Specifically, the Court assumed that Pinhas's medical 
staff privileges were revoked after an unfair peer review process and 
that the hospital intended-under the HCQIA-to disseminate the 
peer review board's conclusions about his unfitness so as to '''pre-
clude him from continued competition in the market place, not only 
at the defendant Midway Hospital [but also] ... in California, if 
not the United States.'''97 
In affirming the court of appeals, the Court noted the Sherman 
Act requires that complaints brought under its aegis allege that 
interstate commerce is affected by the conspiracy claimed.98 The 
hospital argued that the boycott of a single surgeon has no significant 
effect on interstate commerce, the complaint alleged no lack of an 
adequate supply of other surgeons to perform the services, and there 
was then "no factual nexus between the restraint on this one sur-
94. Id. at 1031-32. 
95. [d. at 1034. Dr. Pinhas had also sought a declaratory judgment that the Health 
Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 (42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152) was un-
constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 1025. The district court 
had dismissed this claim, and the court of appeals affirmed, agreeing that the 
appellees "are not the appropriate parties to defend a constitutional challenge 
to the relevant . . . federal statutes," because "the appellees had no interest 
in the enforcement of ... the federal regulation." [d. at 1034-35. 
96. Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 111 S. Ct. 1842 (1991). 
97. Id. at 1846 (alterations in original) (citations omitted). 
98. [d. 
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geon's practice and interstate commerce."99 The Court, however, held 
that the alleged restraint of trade, accomplished by misuse of a 
congressionally regulated peer review process, resulted in foreclosing 
Pinhas's access to the market for ophthalmological services provided 
by hospitals in the Los Angeles area and therefore "ha[d] a sufficient 
nexus with interstate commerce to support federal jurisdiction." HlO 
The dissent, written by Justice Scalia and joined by Justices 
O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter, lamented the decision because it 
made federal jurisdiction turn not on the effect on commerce of the 
restraint, nor to the effect on commerce of the defendants' "infected 
activities," 101 but "rather, it seems, to the effect on commerce of 
the activity from which the plaintiff has been excluded."lo2 The 
dissenters felt that the effect of this conspiracy, if successful, would 
not significantly impact interstate commerce. The proposed agree-
ment, for example, would only have affected Dr. Pinhas's practice 
at Midway, and could have no effect on the larger Los Angeles 
market, much less interstate commerce. I03 KlorslO4 also involved only 
one small player in a much larger field, but in Klors the conspiracy 
was broader than an "in-house" dispute; it involved manufacturers 
and distributors. Moreover, as Justice Scalia observed, the Klors 
Court specifically noted that the conspiracy "interfere[d] with the 
free flow .of commerce," whereas in this case, no such interference 
was ever alleged.lOs Justice Scalia summed up his concern about the 
impact of the decision as follows: 
Federal courts are an attractive forum, and the treble dam-
ages of the Clayton Act an attractive remedy. We have 
today made them available for routine business torts, need-
lessly destroying a sensible statutory allocation of federal-
state responsibility and contributing to the trivialization of 
the federal courtS. I06 
99. Id. at 1847. 
100. Id. at 1848. 
101. The term is from McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, 444 U.S. 232 
(1980). Justice Scalia observed that the term had caused great disagreement 
among the courts. Pinhas, III S. Ct. at 1850. It is difficult, he wrote, to 
determine "which 'activities of the defendants' are 'infected'? Are they all the 
activities of the hospital? Only the activities of the eye surgery department? 
The entire practice of eye surgeons who use the hospital? Or, as the Ninth 
Circuit apparently found in this case, the peer review process itself?" Id. 
(citations omitted). 
102. Id. 
103. Id. at 1850-51. 
104. 59 U.S. 207 (1959). 
105. Pin has, III S. Ct. at 1851. Justice Scalia wrote: "The complaint does not 
begin to suggest that the conspiracy at Midway could have even the most 
trivial effect on interstate commerce." Id. at 1853. 
106. Id. at 1854. 
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The HCQIA may be "two steps forward and one step back," 
but medical professionals confronting antitrust complaints have two 
other ditches to defend: increased use of summary judgment in their 
favor and the increased use of the absolute defense of state-action 
immunity. The former holds some promise; the latter is still no-
man's land. Before considering these defenses, however, it is appro-
priate to examine a more immediately obvious defense. The HCQIA 
is not useless; it does afford some protection against antitrust suits 
provided, among other things, the professional review action was 
taken in the "reasonable belief that [it] was in the furtherance of 
quality health care. "107 To act on a belief that they are furthering 
quality health care, however, the actors must have some standard 
against which to measure the caregiving expected by practitioners 
and the care actually delivered. 
D. Showing "Good Faith:" The HCQIA's Defense 
The claim made against the reviewers is typically that the board 
is unjustly pursuing a competent physician. The fact is there are bad 
doctors. Not all malpractice claims are frivolous; good practitioners 
and good hospitals are concerned about quality, and with good 
reason. lOS 
Of course, malpractice is not typical of what transpires in well-
run hospitals. But no one doubts there are bad doctors, just as there 
are bad lawyers and bad roofers. A bad roofer's work may be evident 
because the finished job is unsightly, or because the roof leaks. A 
bad doctor's work is evident if his or her patients have a higher 
infection rate than others, if he or she uses more blood than the 
norm, if the patient makes an inadequate recovery from a procedure 
which does not usually result in such complications, or if the patient 
unexpectedly dies. But using more blood than usual, without more, 
is not proof of malpractice, nor is the death of the patient. What is 
needed are standards against which medical care can be measured to 
determine if substandard care has been provided. 
1. Standards Against Which Hospital Care-Giving is Measured 
a. The Joint Commission's Standards 
The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organi-
zations (JCAHO) is the industry's chief regulator. The Accreditation 
107. 42 U.S.C. § 11112(a)(1) (1993). 
108. See, e.g., WALT BOGDANICH, THE GREAT WHITE LIE: How AMERICA'S HOSPITALS 
BETRAY OUR TRUST AND ENDANGER OUR LIVES (1991). The book, carefully 
documented if somewhat sensationalist, draws on more than 15 years of 
reporting on the hospital industry to argue that incidence of serious malpractice 
by doctors, nurses, and staff are "not mere freak accidents or anomalies, [but) 
the direct result of systemic health care problems of enormous proportions." 
Id. at 10. 
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Manual for hospitals contains lists or schedules of standards and a 
"1 to 5" scale for determining the degree of compliance with the 
standards. 109 Hospitals are subject to periodic inspection by accredi-
tation examiners, and must show adequate compliance with the 
. standards. 110 
The problem with the JCAHO standards is that they are not 
specific. For example, a typical standard is that "activities are 
conducted to prevent and control infections in patients and person-
nel."llI Another standard states "adequate infection control devices 
and supplies to be available in patient care areas."JJ2 Exactly what 
the procedures are, or how many units of contaminate bacteria may 
be tolerated in a test swab, is not set out. A more specific type of 
standard would be "Not more than 15 cc of blood should be used 
during a routine appendectomy," but this type of standard is not 
provided. Although the national boards for certifying specialists are 
having increasing influence on the locally applied "normal" perform-
ance limits, most hospitals develop their own standards. JJ3 
Even specific standards, however, are not a perfect measure of 
good care-giving. Suppose, for example, that a particular doctor has 
an infection rate three times that of other doctors. Several factors 
could be the cause: operative technique, hardware, use of antibiotics, 
or perhaps post-operative treatment. Isolating the cause is not easy; 
usually it is not one thing, but a systemic problem. A review of 
patient care is of course necessary. 
b. Hospital Quality Assurance Programs 
Hospitals that have good quality assurance programs promulgate 
standards of care usually in a document such as a Hospital Quality 
Management Plan.1 14 The standards generally provide for on-going 
reviews such as monitoring medical staff functions (Le., review of 
surgical cases, blood usage, medical records, drug usage), provisional 
status review, and special (focused) reviews. A showing that peer 
review procedures were conducted in good faith, as is required by 
the HCQIA, is based on a demonstration that there are reasonably 
109. 2 JOINT COMM'N ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTH CARE ORGS., ACCREDITATION 
MANUAL FOR Hosps. (1994) [hereinafter JCAHCO MANUAL]. 
110. Interview with Dr. John S. Moore, Ph.D, President of the St. Joseph Hospital 
Board of Trustees, in Bellingham, WA (May 7, 1992); interview with Catherine 
Anderson, R.N., Director, Quality Management Services, St. Joseph Hospital, 
in Bellingham, WA (May 24, 1992 and September 8, 1994). 
Ill. JCAHCO MANUAL, supra note 109, § IC 1.3.2, at 122. 
112. [d. § IC 1.3 .2.l.l, at 122. 
113. Interview with Catherine Anderson, supra note 110. 
fl4. JCAHCO MANUAL, supra note 109, § LD .4, at 34. 
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established standards and an on-going program to compare practice 
to the standards. 
c. Computerized Statistical Quality Control 
In progressive hospitals the results of on-going reviews are fed 
into computer files as data modules, numerically identified by the 
practitioner .IIS The modules might include information on each phy-
sician's blood usage for a particular surgical operation, infection 
control records, drug usage reviews, and information from the patient 
files such as procedures, diagnoses, consultants, and special studies. 
This information may be variously manipulated. For the purposes of 
quality assurance, it is abstracted and automatically compared to the 
hospital norms. A doctor's practices that are outside the norms will 
be flagged by the program, and a review may commence. 1I6 
2. Peer Review Procedures 
If comparing a practitioner's performance to the hospital norms 
raises concerns, peer review is appropriate. This process should follow 
a set procedure in order to avoid the appearance of any ad hoc 
activity. The record of on-going reviews should have noted any 
concerns, typically designated as "minor" (a practice outside the 
standard of care, with the risk of morbidity but not adverse outcome, 
or a problem without potential significant adverse effects), "mod-
erate" (a practice resulting in avoidable patient morbidity, or a 
potential for significant adverse effects), or "major" (clearly outside 
the standards, that results or could 'result in significant morbidity or 
death).117 If the reviews reveal practices serious enough to warrant 
more than minor corrective suggestions, further investigation is un-
dertaken. The practitioner is usually provided an opportunity to 
comment at this stage, and these comments become part of the review 
file. liS The procedure should provide for interdepartmental commu-
nication, disposition and confidentiality of the peer review records 
thus created, and of multiple review levels.lI9 
3. Use of Statistical Quality Control in the "Good Faith" 
Defense 
The Joint Commission's standards should be the basis for prom-
ulgation of more specific in-hospital quality care criteria. 120 These 




119. [d. See also Bovbjerg, supra note 1. 
120. See JCAHCO MANUAL, supra note 109. 
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locally-developed standards may be statistically compared to the 
practitioner's delivery, and if the delivery is sub-standard, the record 
of the statistical quality control system may stand as evidence that 
peer review actions were taken in good faith. Such standards provide 
a defense based on well-documented criteria indicating incompetence. 
IV. OTHER ANTITRUST DEFENSES: ANTITRUST 
IMMUNITY, INCREASED USE OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
A. State Action Immunity: Use of Absolute Defenses 
The Parker doctrine asserts that the Sherman Act does not apply 
to anti competitive actions of a state. In Parker v. Brown,121 the 
petitioner was a raisin grower. 122 He brought suit against the Cali-
fornia Director of Agriculture to enjoin the enforcement of a mar-
keting plan. 123 The plan had been adopted under a state agricultural 
adjustment act and was designed to reduce competition among food 
producers in the state so as to stabilize prices. 124 The Court created 
the Parker doctrine, consisting of a rigorous two prong test, to 
determine if the state action exemption would shield anti competitive 
acts taken by private parties. 12s Specifically, "the challenged restraint 
must be 'one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state 
policy,"'I26 and the anticompetitive act "must be 'actively supervised 
by the State itself."'127 In Parker, the Court found no conspiracy 
because no contract was made by the state agency.l28 
One might expect that because medical peer review boards are 
established according to law and supervised by the Board of Medical 
Examinersl29 and the state judicial system they would be within the 
121. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). 
122. [d. at 344. 
123. [d. 
124. [d. at 346. 
125. [d. at 350. 
126. Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 100 (1988) (citations omitted). 
127. [d. (citations omitted). 
128. Parker, 317 U.S. at 352. 
129. See Bovbjerg, supra note 1 and text accompanying notes 84-92 regarding 
"legislative enactments" aimed at medical quality. For example, the Revised 
Code of Washington Annotated provides that a "state medical disciplinary 
board ... [which] shall be an administrative agency of the state," and it has 
authority, under § 18.130.050 to investigate claims of medical malpractice, hold 
hearings, and deny, revoke, or suspend licenses to practice medicine under 
§ 18.130.120. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 18.72.040 (West 1989). See also 
Patrick, 486 U.S. at 101 (noting that the State of Oregon actively supervises 
the peer review process through the State Health Division, the Board of Medical 
Examiners, and the judicial system). 
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Parker exemption. Surprisingly, the Supreme Court has held other~ 
wise in a recent decision. In Patrick v. Burget,130 Dr. Timothy Patrick, 
petitioner, was an Astoria, Oregon, surgeon who declined an invi-
tation by respondents to join them as a partner in the Astoria Clinic 
and instead began an independent practice in competition with them. 131 
The clinic doctors then effectively blackballed him: they shunned 
him, refused to refer patients to him, and "showed reluctance to 
assist petitioner with his own patients. "132 They also refused to 
provide backup coverage for his patients, and criticized him for 
having none. 133 Ultimately, at the request of one of the clinic sur-
geons, the executive committee of the Columbia Memorial Hospital 
voted to recommend the termination of Patrick's privileges because 
his patient care was "substandard."I34 Columbia Memorial was the 
only hospital in Astoria, and a majority of its staff members were 
employees of the clinic. I3S Patrick sued in federal court alleging a 
violation of the Sherman Act; the jury found for Patrick and awarded 
$650,000, which was trebled by operation of the Sherman Act's 
provision for treble damages. 136 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit, while admitting that the respondents' treatment of Dr. Pa-
trick was "shabby, unprincipled and unprofessional"137 nevertheless 
reversed. It found the respondents' actions within the Parker exemp-
tion because the State Health Division, the Board of Medical Ex-
aminers, and the state judiciary constituted active state supervision. 138 
The Supreme Court disagreed. It found that the Oregon Health 
Division's authority only related to procedures and did not encompass 
ultimate authority over private privilege determinations. 139 The Board 
of Medical Examiners' principal function was to regulate the licensing 
of physicians, and it had no power to disapprove private privilege 
decisions. l40 The Court also found that the state judiciary did not 
exercise active supervision because all that Oregon case law allowed 
was a review to determine if due process -requirements were met; 
thus, the judicial supervision fell "far short of satisfying the active 
supervision requirement." 141 The Court recognized that fear of an-
titrust litigation might chill peer review activity, but observed that if 
130. 486 U.S. 94 (1988). 
131. [d. at 96. 
132. [d. 
133. [d. 
134. [d. at 97. 
135. [d. at 96. 
136. [d. at 98. 
137. Patrick v. Burget, 800 F.2d 1498, 1509 (9th Cir. 1986). 
138. [d. at 1506. 
139. Patrick, 486 U.S. at 102. 
140. [d. at 103. 
141. [d. at 104. 
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antitrust laws are indeed not to apply to medical care, the legislature 
should make that determination, not the judiciary. 142 
Shortly after Patrick was decided, the Eleventh Circuit consid-
ered a similar case. In Bolt v. Halifax Hospital Medical Center 
("HHMC"),143 Dr. Bolt was denied privileges by three hospitals in 
the Daytona Beach, Florida area after he refused to undertake 
psychiatric counselling following allegations of wrongdoing. l44 He 
sued the members of the peer review panels and the hospitals, 
alleging, inter alia, an antitrust violation.J45 The defendants raised 
the Parker exemption as a defense. l46 An appeals panel determined 
that in Florida there is sufficient judicial oversight of private peer 
review panels to constitute "state action": the courts will review the 
fairness of the procedures, the validity of the criteria used (compared 
to state policy), and the sufficiency of the evidence. 147 The private 
hospital, the hospital special taxing district and members of their 
medical staffs involved in the peer review were immune. l48 
The case was then heard en banc, and the full panel vacated the 
prior decision because the private party defendants formally withdrew 
any claim that they were immune from antitrust liability under the 
state-action doctrine. 149 Thereafter, the panel reconsidered the case. 150 
At this second hearing, the HHMC withdrew its claim that it was 
immune as a private party, developing two new state action argu-
ments. The hospital first argued· that it was a state agency, or was 
entitled to the status of such because it was closely supervised by the 
state.15I The court found it was not a state agency.152 Moreover, it 
opined that even if it were a state agency, had it nevertheless engaged 
in a conspiracy, such would be outside the Parker rule. 153 Further-
more, the court determined that HHMC was not so actively super-
142. [d. at 105. 
143. 851 F.2d 1273 (11th Cir. 1988). 
144. [d. at 1276-77. 
145. [d. at 1277. 
146. [d. at 1279 (citing Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943». 
147. [d. at 1283-84. Patrick, however, would apparently require more than that. 
The Supreme Court said "active supervision mandates that the State exercise 
ultimate control over the challenged anticompetitive conduct." Patrick v. 
Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 101 (1988). Review of procedure, validity of criteria, and 
sufficiency of evidence may result in a decision to overrule the peer review 
panel, but it is not really "ultimate control" over the decision. [d. 
148. Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Ctr., , 851 F.2d 1273, 1284 (11th Cir. 1988). 
149. Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Medical Ctr., 874 F.2d 755 (11th Cir. 1989) (en banc). 
150. Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Medical Ctr., 891 F.2d 810 (11th Cir. 1990). 
151. [d. at 823. 
152. [d. 
153. "When a state agency joins in a private anticompetitive agreement not required 
by the state, the agency loses its protected status under Parker." [d. at 823 
n.23 (citing Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 790-92 (1975». 
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vised by the state as to qualify for the special status of state-
sovereign. ls4 The hospital's second argument was that, even if it were 
not a state agency, it was the equivalent of a municipality and 
therefore exempt from antitrust laws under the Town of Hallie 
doctrine. ISS The court did agree that as a special county taxing district 
the HHMC had some quasi-municipal attributes, and recognized that 
the legislature's grant of peer review power to the Center contem-
plated some kind of boycott against doctors who were denied privi-
leges. ls6 The court reasoned, however, that the allegations involved 
actions ultra vires and went beyond the protection afforded by Parker 
and its progeny.1S7 HHMC, therefore, was not entitled to immunity. 
In the Pin has caselS8 the defendant hospital also raised the "state 
action" defense. ls9 Applying the Patrick test, however, the Ninth 
Circuit found inadequate active state supervision, and concluded, 
therefore, that acts of the hospital were not immune from challenge 
under the state action defense. l60 The issue was not raised on appeal 
to the Supreme Court. 
B. Increased Use of Summary Judgment 
The Supreme Court has enhanced defendants' prospects in group 
boycott antitrust actions, including medical professional actions, by 
effectively removing them from per se analysis. The Court eroded 
defendants' prospects under the Health Care Quality Improvement 
Act by allowing ready invocation of federal antitrust jurisdiction 
upon a mere claim of bad faith in the "group boycott" process. 
Attempts by non-pUblic medical facilities to use the absolute defense 
154. /d. at 824. 
155. The Town 0/ Hallie doctrine provides "that when a municipality engages in 
anticompetitive conduct pursuant to 'a clearly expressed state policy', the 
conduct constitutes state action for the purposes of Parker even without a 
showing of active state supervision." [d. at 825 (quoting Town of Hallie v. 
Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 40 (1985». 
156. [d. at 825. 
157. [d. The court found no evidence to support the community-wide conspiracy 
claim holding that: (1) evidence of parallel action by the hospitals proved 
nothing; (2) that inter-hospital communication about Dr. Bolt could have been 
for a legitimate independent business purpose; and (3) that the direct evidence 
that decision makers at the hospitals agreed among themselves to take concerted 
action to drive Dr. Bolt out of the Daytona Beach area could be interpreted 
as being nothing more than evidence that decision makers at each hospital 
based their decisions partly on matters that occurred at the other two hospitals. 
[d. at 826-27. However, the court then held that the district court had 
erroneously prohibited Dr. Bolt from submitting other evidence of a commu-
nity-wide conspiracy, and the case was remanded. [d. at 827-28. 
158. See supra text accompanying notes 82-107. 
159. Pinhas v. Summit Health Ltd., 894 F.2d 1024 (9th Cir. 1989). 
160. [d. at 1029-30. 
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of government immunity have not received favorable judicial treat-
ment. 
There is, however, one last area to examine. The Supreme Court 
has eased the defendant's burden by changing the criteria by which 
the plaintiff's case can be dismissed on summary judgment. In 
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 161 respon-
dents Zenith and other American manufacturers of consumer elec-
tronic products brought an action in district court in 1974 alleging 
that Matsushita and other Japanese firms were "dumping" televisions 
in the United States (Le., selling them in the United States for less 
than the same product was sold for in Japan).162 After several years 
of discovery, the petitioners moved for summary judgment, upon 
which the district court directed the parties to file statements listing 
all the documentary evidence that would be offered if the case were 
tried. 163 Finding that the bulk of the respondents' evidence would be 
inadmissible and that what was left did not raise a genuine issue of 
material fact as to the existence of any conspiracy and that any 
inference of conspiracy was unreasonable, the district court granted 
petitioners' motion. l64 The court of appeals then reversed, finding 
that much of the excluded evidence would be admissible and that 
there was both direct and circumstantial evidence of a conspiracy 
sufficient to allow a reasonable fact finder to find a conspiracy to 
depress prices in the United States. 165 
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, reinstating 
the district court's summary judgment. The Court reviewed the 
requirements for successfully resisting a summary judgment: there 
must be a genuine issue of material fact as to whether petitioners 
entered into an illegal conspiracy that caused respondents to suffer 
a cognizable- injury.l66 But, the Court said, if the claims made by the 
respondents are simply implausible-if they make no economic sense-
then respondents must come forward with more evidence to support 
their claim than would otherwise be reasonable in order to convince 
a court that there is a material issue of fact.167 To orchestrate a 
conspiracy among as many firms over as long a time as here alleged 
would be extremely difficult; it would require years of losses before 
there would be any profitable effect followed by years of high profits 
to recoup the losses. l68 The Court noted that there was no evidence 
161. 475 u.S. 574 (1986). 
162. Id. at 577-78. 
163. Id. at 578. 
164. Id. at 578-79. 
165. Id. at 580-81. 
166. Id. at 585-86. 
167. Id. at 587. 
168. Id. at 589-90. 
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of the alleged conspiracy's success after 20 years: RCA and Zenith 
continued to hold the largest share of the color television market 
notwithstanding the alleged conspiracy and decreasing prices. 169 If it 
had not worked after so long a period, the Court said, it probably 
never existed yo Moreover, if the petitioners here had been selling 
their televisions at a low profit, it is possible that they were just 
better competitors; it would defeat the whole purpose· of antitrust 
law if factfinders could infer conspiracies even where such inferences 
are implausible. 171 On remand, the Court said that the court of 
appeals would be "free to consider whether there is other evidence 
that is sufficiently unambiguous to permit a trier of fact to find that 
petitioners conspired to price predatorily for two decades despite the 
absence of any apparent motive to do SO,"172 but this evidence must 
"tend to exclude the possibility" that the underpricing was pro-
competitive rather than an anti-competitive, "economically senseless 
conspiracy."173 The Ninth Circuit summarized the Supreme Court's 
Matsushita decision in T. W. Electrical Service v. Pacific Electrical 
Contractors Ass'n.174 The court stated: 
Where an antitrust plaintiff's allegation of a conspiracy is 
based solely on indirect evidence that is capable of inferences 
of both lawful and unlawful behavior, the plaintiff must 
produce some evidence tending to exclude the possibility 
that the defendant acted independently. If the plaintiff does 
not produce such evidence or provide a reason for not doing 
so .. . a grant of summary judgment in favor of the 
defendant is appropriate. 17s 
In the area of medical peer review, the mere fact that physicians 
who sit on peer review boards within a hospital may have the power 
to exclude direct competitors from that hospital will not inoculate 
the plaintiff's case against summary judgment dismissal. In Cooper 
v. Forsyth County Hospital Authority, Inc.,176 doctors Carlos T. 
Cooper, Jr. and E. Joseph Daniels brought a private antitrust action. 
The two were licensed podiatrists who had sought hospital privileges 
for the performance of certain surgical operations allowed under 
North Carolina licensing statutes. 177 The bylaws of the hospital re-
169. [d. at 591. 
170. [d. at 592. 
171. [d. at 593-94. 
172. [d. at 597. 
173. [d. at 597-98 (citation omitted). 
174. 809 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1987). 
175. [d. at 632. 
176. 789 F.2d 278 (4th Cir. 1986). 
177. [d. at 279. 
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stricted surgical privileges to physicians and dentists, excluding po-
diatrists. 178 A hospital bylaws committee undertook hearings on 
whether the hospital bylaws should be amended.179 Orthopedic sur-
geons with surgical privileges participated in the hearings and objected 
to proposed amendments: "[i]n the event podiatrists were granted 
surgical privileges, podiatrists and orthopedists arguably would com-
pete to perform certain surgical procedures." 180 Although the evidence 
was clear that the orthopedists and the North Carolina Orthopedic . 
Association discussed the issue, that orthopedists appeared before 
the bylaws committee and that the recommendation adverse to the 
podiatrists followed, this was not sufficient to overcome a motion 
to dismiss}81 The evidence was insufficient to support the inference 
of a conspiracy, and-as one might imagine-there were affidavits 
from the defendants denying any anti-competitive animus and as-
serting that their opposition to granting podiatrists surgical privileges 
was based on quality of patient care grounds}82 
V. CONCLUSION 
Medical professionals confronted with a loss of hospital privi-
leges by action of a peer review panel will not successfully invoke 
the traditional per se antitrust analysis. Per se analysis has clearly 
eroded, even when the line of commerce is commodities. It is certainly 
clear that "group boycotts" by professionals are not subject to per 
se condemnation; rather, they are judged by the Rule of Reason. 
While the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 immunizes 
good faith peer review actions, an allegation of bad faith is easy to 
make and apparently automatically qualifies a case for federal anti-
trust jurisdiction. The chilling effect of possible litigation, therefore, 
continues to hamper effective peer review activity. The Joint Com-
. mission on the Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations has recently 
revised its accreditation standards. 183 These are inadequate to be 
useful in setting specific standards of care, but they do provide a 
framework within which more specific standards can be developed 
by hospitals. The rigorous adoption and policing of standards, aug-
mented by computerized quality reporting can create a solid record 
of the quality of a physician's care-giving. If that record is poor, it . 
prevents an objective and defensible method of demonstrating that 




181. [d. at 281. 
182. [d. at 282. 
183. JCAHCO MANUAL, supra note 109. It is considered revised compared to 
previous editions. 
. .. 
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Non-public defendant hospitals have not been able to successfully 
invoke the "governmental immunity" antitrust exemption because 
courts have been unwilling to find that these health care facilities 
possess the required governmental attributes. Defendants may, how-
ever, prevail on a summary judgment dismissal if the plaintiff does 
not produce some admissible evidence which tends to exclude the 
possibility that there was a good faith reason for the boycott. 
Maintaining, policing and recording of standards remains the best 
insurance against incompetent and unprofessional care-giving, and 
the best defense against the threat of antitrust litigation. 
